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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
v. Beauregard Parish School Board.16 It was found that certain
third parties were not bound by an erroneous description -in a
tax title involving a typographical error in the range number.
Justices Hawthorne and Moise dissented, feeling that the public
records themselves were sufficient to put the third parties on
notice. The former also believed that the constitutional period of
peremption of tax titles protected the title of the purchaser.
Several cases dealt with miscellaneous problems of no great
consequence. A difficult problem of interpretation was examined
with care and resolved in favor of the defendant.' 7 A stipulation
of no warranty, not even for a return of the purchase price, was
enforced as written.1 8 The court decided that the transaction
amounted to the sale of a chance or hope. Although it was stated
that Article 2503 was controlling, it appears that Article 2505
might have been relied upon as more direct authority. Against
the dissent of the Chief Justice, registered in an opinion in which
the facts were painstakingly analyzed, 9 recovery was allowed
of funds found to have been advanced for the purchase price of
real estate. The second highest bidder at a partition sale was
found to have had no standing to claim the property when the
first bidder failed to comply.20 And in two cases 21 the court
applied the settled rule that where a timber vendee has exercised
the right to cut and remove all of the merchantable timber, the
contract for the sale thereof is terminated, even in the absence
of a specified removal period.
SECURITY DEVICES
Joseph Dainow*
RANKING OF PRIVILEGES
In establishing privileges as exemptions from the general
rule of proration among creditors,' the Civil Code granted such
a preference to certain debts by reason of their nature, and in
16. 220 La. 592, 57 So. 2d 197 (1952).
17. Interstate Natural Gas Co., Inc. v. Mississippi River Fuel Corp., 220
La. 43, 55 So. 2d 775 (1951).
18. In re Canal Bank & Trust Co., 221 La. 184, 59 So. 2d 115 (1952).
19. Devron v. Goesling, 221 La. 53, 58 So. 2d 709 (1952).
20. Brewer v. Cowan, 220 La. 189, 56 So. 2d 149 (1951).
21. Blanchard v. Norman-Breaux Lumber Co., Inc., 220 La. 633, 57 So. 2d
211 (1952); Dalton v. Norman-Breaux Lumber Co., Inc., 220 La. 647, 57 So. 2d
216 (1952).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Arts. 3182-3183, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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situations where privileges came into competition among them-
selves, the order of their ranking was again determined on the
basis of the nature of the debt to which the privilege was
attached.2 The statutes which subsequently added new privileges
contained a ranking provision which usually followed the same
principle of establishing priorities according to the nature of the
basic claims. The one notable departure from this system of
ranking is in the Chattel Mortgage Law which-through all the
changes and developments-contains a ranking provision which
introduced a chronological basis for deciding priorities3 where a
chattel mortgage is involved.
Since the Civil Code privileges compete among themselves
without reference to the date of their creation, there was no need
for the code to specify the exact time at which each came into
existence. When a code privilege competes with a chattel mort-
gage, however, it is necessary to place a date tag on the former
in order to get it into a chronological frame of reference with the
recordation date of the latter. In several instances the court has
already dealt with this problem, and a more complete discussion
of this subject will be covered in a later article. During the past
term, one new item was added by the court to the chronological
reference points for Civil Code privileges.
In the case of Union Credit Company v. Croswell Company,
Incorporated,4 the Civil Code privilege of a secretary5 was in
competition with a chattel mortgage. The chattel mortgage was
duly recorded subsequent to the beginning of the employment
but prior to a salary reduction and the eventual failure to pay
the salary altogether. The court of appeal gave preference to
the chattel mortgage on the theory that the secretary's privilege
attached only when the debt became due. This was reversed by
the Supreme Court, which recognized the secretary's privilege
as existing from the original date of employment which "could
not be considered anything other than a continuous contract."
The creation and existence of the privilege are not conditioned
upon any outstanding indebtedness but are intended to secure
the payment of wages in preference to other claims.
2. Arts. 3186-3187, 3254-3270, La. Civil Code of 1870. See Dainow, Article
3267 and the Ranking of Privileges, 9 LOUiSIANA LAW REvIEW 370, 371-374
(1949).
3. La. R.S. 1950, 9:5354: "Every such mortgage shall be . . . superior in
rank to any privilege or preference arising subsequently thereto." (Italics
supplied.)
4. 219 La. 993, 54 So. 2d 425 (1951).
5. Arts. 3191, 3214, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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The establishment of each privilege, both in the code and in
the statutes, is based upon certain policy considerations, sufficient
in every instance to outweigh the general policy of proration
among creditors. The decision in the present case is likewise one
of policy and of effectuating the legislative intent underlying the
original establishment of the secretary's privilege. The conten-
tion that the change in salary constituted a new contract with
a new privilege was not considered as pertinent in view of the
custom and practice in such employment relationships, as distin-
guished from changes in rent or other adjustments which may
occur between landlord and tenant.
BUILDING CONSTRUCTION PRIVILEGES
Under the building contract law6 the materialman's privilege
does not prime a mortgage if the mortgage exists and is duly
recorded "before any material is furnished." On a single building
construction project the matter is a simple one of comparing
dates, but in the cases of Jones & Sons v. Meyer and Security
National Bank v. Meyer,7 the construction involved an extensive
housing development in which twenty-two units were planned.
The owner proceeded in groups of four, and it was with the third
and fourth groups that he got into financial difficulties. The mort-
gage given on these latter properties was recorded before any
materials were furnished for them, but the materialman claimed
priority on the ground that the entire project was one and that
the mortgage had been recorded subsequent to the furnishing of
supplies for the first and second groups of houses. The issue
thus became one of fact-to determine whether the whole plan
for the twenty-two houses was one construction project, and on
the evidence the court found it was not a single continuous or
blanket development project. The trial court's judgment sus-
taining the priority of the mortgage was affirmed. Large scale
housing developments involve many incidental security prob-
lems; a clarification of the important facts in the construction
plan consistently with statements in the mortgage and supply
contracts can provide a basis for reliable advice and the avoid-
ance of disputes.
PRIVILEGE ON OIL AND GAS WELLS
Every privilege, with its priority, is in the nature of an excep-
tion to the general rule of equality and proration among creditors.8
6. La. Act 323 of 1938; La. R.S. 1950, 9:4812.
7. 200 La. 153, 55 So. 2d 898 (1951).
8. Arts. 3182-3183, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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Accordingly, no privilege can exist without code or statutory
text, and in matters of privileges the rule of strict interpretation
is necessarily followed. In each case the requirements for the
existence of the privilege must be complied with completely;
however, on the other hand, a privilege cannot be made depen-
dent upon conditions not specified under that particular statute.
Thus, the owner of property cannot assert a lessor's lien against
the effects of the occupant where there is no contract of lease
between the parties; 9 conversely, the automobile mechanic has a
lien on the car he has repaired even though the work was not
ordered by the owner.10
In the case of Oil Well Supply Company v. Independent Oil
Company" the defendant resisted an asserted privilege on oil and
gas wells on the ground that there had been no contractual rela-
tionship between the plaintiff supplier and either the owner or
operator of the wells. There was no denial of the delivery of the
supplies directly on the property, nor was there any other basis
of defense under the statute.' 2 At the same time, however, neither
was there any requirement under the statute that the privilege
be limited to supplies furnished under contract with the owner
or operator. Accordingly, the court sustained the privilege and
affirmed the lower court's judgment maintaining a writ of pro-
visional seizure.
CHATTEL MORTGAGES
The chattel mortgage law may be considered as consisting
of two principal parts: one which authorizes the chattel mortgage
and sets out the requirements for its creation and the scope of its
effectiveness,' 3 and the other which is meant to deter fraud or
abuse in connection with mortgaged property.' 4 Among the latter
provisions is one which imposes personal liability for the principal
debt upon the purchaser of chattel mortgaged property who fails
to procure an affidavit of non-encumbrance from an out-of-parish
vendor.' 5 The full impact of the operation of this provision was
felt in the case of Harris Finance Company v. Fridge.'6 The his-
9. Arts. 2705, 3218, La. Civil Code of 1870; Fisk v. Moores, 11 Rob. 279
(La. 1845).
10. La. R.S. 1950, 9:4501.
11. 219 La. 936, 54 So. 2d 330 (1951).
12. La. Act 68 of 1942; La. R.S. 1950, 9:4861 et seq.
13. La. R.S. 1950, 9:5351-5358, 5363-5365.
14. La. R.S. 1950, 9:5359-5362.
15. La. R.S. 1950, 9:5362; La. Act 172 of 1944, § 8.
16. 219 La. 1106, 55 So. 2d 707 (1951).
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tory of this section and a full analysis of its possibilities have been
set out in an earlier issue of this REVIEW.17 In the present case, the
defendant purchaser was held personally liable for the principal
debt because he had not obtained the appropriate affidavit, despite
the fact that the plaintiff mortgagee had not recorded the chattel
mortgage, and regardless of a possible disparity between the
amount of the principal debt and the current value of the auto-
mobile involved.
The result of this statute goes far beyond that contemplated
by the system of mortgage. While agreeing with the purpose of
protecting the chattel mortgagee and deterring fraud or abuse
by third persons, one might well consider it pertinent for the
Legislature to re-examine this statutory provision with a view to
giving the warranted protection to one interest without unduly
harming the other.
SUCCESSIONS, DONATIONS AND
COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Harriet S. Daggett*
In the Succession of Gumbell Mr. Gumbel had made Touro
Infirmary his residuary legatee. Later, at a time when he was
too ill to prepare another codicil, he wrote the President of Touro
Infirmary asking that certain changes be made in connection with
the devolution of his property after his death. The president
acceded to this request and the Board of Directors of Touro
Infirmary by resolution passed after Mr. Gumbel's death con-
firmed the president's action. Later, the executor petitioned the
court for an order to carry out all wishes of the deceased, includ-
ing those mentioned in his letter to the President of Touro. All
legatees joined in the petition except Touro Infirmary, which had
previously passed the resolution. The court granted the order
and then one of the legatees who had signed the petition attacked
the order, stating that previously she had been unaware of her
rights and had been mistaken in the belief that her legacy would
be unaffected by the agreement with Touro Infirmary. Although
the executor showed that sufficient funds had been retained to
protect her legacy, she entered opposition to the executor's pro-
visional account. Obviously the agreement was neither a will nor
17. Note, 12 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 516 (1952).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 220 La. 266, 56 So. 2d 418 (1951).
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